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The Concept of Anachronism and the 
Historian’s Truth Jacques Rancière1 In 
the preface to his book The Problem of 
Unbelief in the Sixteenth Century: The 
Religion of Rabelais, Lucien Febvre tells us 
the following:“The problem is to determine 
what set of precautions to take and what 
rules to follow in order to avoid the worst 
of all sins, the sin that cannot be forgiven—
anachronism.”2 Febvre’s text raises, for 
us, three questions, which I shall try to 
untangle here. Firstly, why, for the historian, 
is anachronism the unforgivable sin above 
all others? Secondly, to be such a sin, what 
must anachronism be? Thirdly, to give 
anachronism the status of a sin fatal to the 
spirit of history, what must history be? This 
triple questioning falls within the framework 
of a larger reflection on the question of truth 
in history, a reflection led by a hypothesis that
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which “prochronism” and “parachronism” are particular types. Yet these 
rationalisations do not last long. Anachronism has remained alone to 
indicate the mistake against chronology in general.
What is the reason for this privilege? For me, one must look for it in 
the double sense of ana-. This prefix indicates another movement, from 
below to above. A hypothesis can be deduced from this: anachronism is so 
called because what is at stake is not only a problem of succession. It is not a 
horizontal problem of the order of times but a vertical problem of the order 
of time in the hierarchy of beings. It is a problem of the division (partage) of 
time, in the sense of “what one receives as one’s share” (ce que l’on reçoit en 
partage).3 The question of anachronism concerns what truth time has as it 
is divided, in a vertical order that connects time to what is above it, that is to 
say, what one ordinarily calls eternity.
To break down the terms of the problem, anachronism, let us say, does 
not concern the simple turning back (la remontée) from one date toward 
another. It concerns moving on from (la remontée) this time of dates toward 
that which is not the time of dates.4 This movement indicates two different 
relations, which I will examine in turn. It is, first of all, a movement toward 
the time that one cannot date, the time of legends. The European humanist 
tradition has known three great chronologies: the Christian chronology 
defined by the birth of Jesus Christ, the Roman chronology ab urbe condita, 
and the Greek chronology linked to the Olympiads.5 However, anachronism 
first of all concerned this junction of times. It consisted of an overlapping 
of legendary times with those of a certified chronology (whatever its 
exactitude might be). The major example of anachronism mentioned in the 
classical age is that of which Virgil writes, the loves of Dido and Aeneas. It 
could be noted that anachronism, the mistake against history par excellence, 
concerns two perfectly fictional characters, lacking any historical reality. 
The reason for this apparent strangeness is simple. Anachronism, before 
defining the requirements of the historian, defines those of poetry and 
fiction. The fault of Virgil is not to have put what is after before (Carthage 
before the time of the Trojan War). It is to have put together two times 
that come under two different regimes of truth and define two different 
requirements for fiction. The Trojan War and Aeneas belong to legendary 
1. Trans. Originally 
published 
as ‘Le concept 
d’anachronisme 
et la vérité de 
l’historien,’ L’Inactuel: 
psychanalyse et culture 
6, Autumn (1996): 
53–68
2. Lucien Febvre, 
Le problème de 
l’incroyance au XVIe 
siècle. La religion de 
Rabelais, (Paris: Albin 
Michel, 1968), 15. The 
Problem of Unbelief in 
the Sixteenth Century: 
The Religion of 
Rabelais, translated by 
B. Gottlieb, (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1985), 
5. Trans. We have given 
a direct translation 
from the French quoted 
by Rancière. This is 
because the English 
translation by Gottlieb 
corrects Febvre’s use 
of the present tense 
by using the past 
tense. For example, 
the Febvre text in 
French, “Un enfant naît. 
Il vit. Sans delai, on le 
porte à l’église,” which 
translates directly as “A 
child is born. He lives. 
Without delay, they 
take him to the church,” 
Gottlieb translates as 
“A child was born, and 
it was living. It was 
carried without delay 
to the church.” For 
reasons that become 
clear below, it is 
important to leave the 
French in the historical 
present.
.
I now formulate in the most general way. The hypothesis is that the 
constitution of history as a scientific discourse involves a knot of 
philosophical questions which have nothing to do with questions 
concerning the “methodology” or the “epistemology” of history. This 
knot concerns rather the relations of time, speech, and truth. Yet it is 
never treated as such in the historian’s discourse. It is treated instead by 
poetic procedures for the construction of historical narrative. I understand 
“poetic” in the classical sense, namely that which comes under a techne 
for the construction of a plot, for the arrangement of its parts and its 
appropriate mode of enunciation. In other words, the three traditional 
functions of inventio, dispositio, and elocutio. The hypothesis, therefore, can 
be summarised as follows: history is constituted as a science by resolving 
philosophical questions through literary procedures. Nevertheless, history 
fails to acknowledge these procedures. This applies to the problem of 
anachronism in the following way: anachronism is a poetic concept that 
serves as a philosophical rule for the question of the status of truth in the 
historian’s discourse.
Having set this out, we can return to our quotation and to the first 
question to which it gives rise. Why this negative privilege of anachronism? 
To understand this, first of all we must ask, in the first analysis, what is the 
minimal meaning of this word. The Robert dictionary summarises it thus:
“Action de placer un fait, un usage, un personnage, etc., dans 
une époque autre que l’époque à laquelle ils appartiennent ou 
conviennent réellement [The act of placing a fact, a use, a character, 
etc. in a time other than the time to which it really belongs or to 
which it is really suited].”
This definition poses a first problem. According to the primary meaning 
of the prefix ana-, which describes a movement from the rear toward the 
front, from one time toward an earlier, anachronism is the mistake that 
consists of putting a fact too early. In good logical fashion, there must 
be a symmetrical mistake that consists of putting a fact too late. In fact, 
nineteenth-century dictionaries attest to just such an attempt at lexical 
rationalisation. Faced with the sin of anachronism, they invent that of 
parachronism. They even invent a general concept of metachronism, of 
3. Trans. The verb 
partager means both to 
divide and to share out. 
Here, Rancière uses 
both senses.
4. Trans. Rancière here 
uses the numerous 
senses of the noun la 
remontée, which can 
mean an upstream 
journey on a river, 
some process of 
catching up or going 
back up, or a recovery. 
‘Remonter du temps’ 
means to go back in 
time
5. Trans. Ab urbe 
condita (AUB), “from 
the founding of the 
City (Rome),” that is, 
from the year 753 BCE. 
AUB was the system 
of dating used by pre-
Christian Rome.
.
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order of becoming to the order of that which is always identical to itself. 
That is to say, in brief, the relation between Chronos and Æon, between time 
and eternity. Behind the Bible and Saint Augustine, there is the Timaeus 
and the formula that history retains from it, even if it is not literally exact: 
“Time is the mobile image of immobile eternity.”8 The formula gives its 
precise meaning to the idea of the “redemption of time” (rachat du temps). 
To redeem time (racheter le temps)—to redeem the error and falsity of 
becoming—is to make time as “similar” as possible to that which it copies: 
the eternity of Æon. The truthfulness of history depends, before any 
concern with “method,” upon this act of redemption. Yet to redeem time 
cannot mean to put it in order according to the law of succession, since it is 
precisely the constraint of succession that makes time dissimilar to eternity. 
On the contrary, it is to abolish succession as such and to put in its place 
an image as similar as possible to the eternity of truth. It is to oppose time 
as a totality to time as a heterogeneity of successive parts. There are two 
privileged images of the identity of truth in time. The first is the causal order 
that puts the sequence of cause and effect in place of the simple before and 
after of events. The second is permanence, time coagulated into epochs, 
each defined as the law of immanence of its own phenomena.
The first image, the first form of the redemption of time, substitutes 
for the successive order of events the logical order of their reciprocal 
implication. What Polybius, in the second century BCE, calls their symploke 
(‘entwinement’). The work of the historian, as Polybius is the first to define, 
is to manifest this symploke that makes it so that there is not one event 
and then another, but rather, a meaningful totality. It is very clear that 
when Polybius defines these conditions he has in mind a particular text by 
Aristotle: not the Physics, but the Poetics. The theory of symploke responds 
to the Aristotelian hierarchy between philosophy, poetry, and history. Poetry 
is, Aristotle says, more philosophical than history. Indeed, history is the 
domain of kath’ hekaston, of “one by one,” which informs us that there 
is just one thing and then another. As for poetry, it is the domain of the 
general, of the katholon (‘relating to the whole’) that places actions under 
a single, articulated totality. And there are two ways to constitute it, either 
according to necessity or according to verisimilitude (vraisemblance). There 
times. The foundation of Carthage, even if it predates that of Rome, falls 
under Roman chronology. Concerning the time of Aeneas, the poet has 
total freedom, on condition only that he does not contradict Homer. But 
this is not at all the same concerning the time of Carthage, which cannot be 
married to any time whatsoever.
Thus anachronism comes under the truth of poetry before it comes 
under that of the scholar. And it is in the debate on the rights of fiction that 
the characteristics of this concept inherited by historians will be defined.6 
The lively debates of the sixteenth century concerning the rights of poets 
produce an essential rule: the rights of fiction are inversely proportional to 
temporal proximity. The closer one is to the present, the less one can invent, 
and the more fictional invention approaches the limit of the verifiable lie. 
The debate on poetics reveals the idea of an essential relation between the 
truth and the present, the scientific consequences of which we will see.
The above concerned the movement of historic times toward legendary 
times. But the essential relation plays out in another movement. The sin 
against the order of succession of historic time refers to another sin, that 
is, the sin against the hierarchical order according to which the times of 
succession depend upon a time that ignores succession. Chronological time 
depends upon a time without chronology: a pure present, or eternity. As 
we have already seen, anachronism is not the confusion of dates but the 
confusion of epochs. Yet epochs are not simply cut out from the continuity 
of successions. Epochs mark instead specific regimes of truth, relations 
of the order of time to order that is not in time. At the beginning of 
Discourse on Universal History, Bossuet teaches his royal student the need to 
distinguish between times.7 That means, first of all, to distinguish between 
what belongs to the time of natural law, written law, or evangelical law. An 
epoch is, then, a cut-out (découpage) from time determined within an 
economy of revelation and an economy of the manner in which the eternal 
deploys truth and makes it known in time.
The Christian economy of revelation is an economy of the redemption 
of error [une économie du rachat de la faute]. But, behind the redemption of 
error in time, there is the question of the redemption of time itself. Behind 
the relation of fallible, mortal man to Eternity, there is the relation of the 
6. Concerning these 
debates, see in 
particular the work of 
William Nelson, Fact or 
Fiction: The Dilemma of 




7. Trans. The theologian 
Jacques-Bénigne 
Bossuet was a 
renowned preacher 
and in 1670 was 
appointed tutor to 
the Dauphin, eldest 
son of Louis XIV of 
France. His Discourse 
on Universal History 
was published in 1682. 
The standard English 
translation by Elborg 
Forster, edited and 
with an introduction 
by Orest Ranum, was 
published in 1976 by 
University of 
Chicago Press.
8. Trans. Rancière here 
refers to the Socratic 
dialogue. The relevant 
section, which Rancière 
paraphrases rather 
than quotes directly, is 
37c–38b.
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Lucien Febvre that served as our point of departure. Cofounder of Annales 
and founding father of the French historical school, Febvre is, as is well 
known, the incarnation of a certain modern paradigm of the scientific 
nature of history. It is also known that this foundation rests upon a number 
of principles of theoretical rupture. The first affirms the rupture with the so-
called history of events, that of the Aristotelian kath’ hekaston materialised 
by the succession of princes, battles, and treatises, told according to their 
princely chroniclers. In passing, one can remark that the sin of anachronism 
cannot be, without contradicting this rupture, a matter of erroneous 
chronology and of dates ahead of time. The second principle breaks with 
the first form of redemption from the contingency of historical events 
(rachat de l’événementialité). Inaugurated by Polybius and perfected by Saint 
Augustine and Bossuet, this form makes of history a providential series. 
Between the eighteenth century and nineteenth century, this providential 
history is rationalised. At first, it takes the secularised form of universal 
history as the history of the progressive development of the human spirit, 
and then it takes the scientific form of causes necessarily drawn from the 
conditions of human action. However, the scientific historical paradigm 
of Annales also refutes this scientific nature of history in terms of laws and 
causes. What, then, defines the scientific nature of historical discourse? 
Traditional descriptions define it by two inversions of perspective, along 
the two axes of diachrony and synchrony. Upon the first axis is imposed 
the long time of cycles and structures against the short time of events. The 
second axis opposes to the history of princes, battles, and treatises, the 
thickness of the social, the interweaving of ways of doing, being, and 
thinking, from the elementary core of productive and reproductive activities 
up to the more or less elaborate forms of representation through which 
humans live out their relation to these elementary conditions.
My hypothesis is that this double privileging, of long time over short 
time and of the thickness of the social over the superficiality of events, is 
first of all the privileging of a certain type of time: a time that acts as the 
measure (l’efficace) of its own truth, the measure of the eternity that is 
hidden within it. I want to show this by starting from the particular object 
of Lucien Febvre’s book, the question of Rabelais’ “religion.” This book 
is a theoretical superiority of poetry, which sets up a likely (vraisemblable) 
connection between fictive events, over history, which says exactly that 
there was some verified event, then another, and then another.
A significant consequence emerges from this, which disturbs somewhat 
the honest teleologies of the conquest of scientific truths over the fantasies 
of poetic fiction. The promotion of history as discourse of truth comes 
out of its capacity to make itself similar to poetry, to imitate for its own 
benefit the power of poetic generality. This is exactly what Polybius does 
when he constitutes for science a philosophical intrigue (intrigue) of the 
future, the intrigue of necessity. He has to recount a slice of fifty years 
marked by the successive victories of the Romans over the Carthaginians 
and the Macedonians. To do a scholarly history consists, then, of showing 
that the successive victories and violent expansion of the Roman Empire 
are not works of chance but of providence. So, the truth regime of history is 
constituted in a specific connection between the poetic logic of a necessary 
or likely plot (intrigue) and a “theological” logic of the manifestation of the 
order of divine truth in the order of human time.9
Such is the first way to redeem time and to ground history in truth. It 
consists of subsuming time under the plot of a necessary series [of events]. 
I now arrive at the second way, which leads us to the heart of our initial 
question. It is a matter always of constituting time as a whole, but with this 
second figure, it is not a matter of thinking this whole as the interweaving 
of causes and effects according to a principle of transcendence. It is a matter 
of constituting time itself as the principle of immanence that subsumes 
all phenomena under a law of interiority. The truth of history is then the 
immanence of time as the principle of co-presence and co-belonging of 
phenomena. Time thus functions as that which is similar to or substitutes 
for eternity. It doubles up, being the principle of presence—and so of 
eternity—interior to the temporality of phenomena. This second way is 
at the heart of the modern definition of the scientific nature of history (la 
scientificité de l’histoire). And for this [reason] history places at its heart the 
question of anachronism as mortal sin, a sin against the presence of eternity 
in time, the presence of eternity as time.
To illustrate the above propositions, we can return to the sentence from 
9. Trans. There are two 
meanings of l’intrigue 
in use here, both as a 
‘puzzle’ or ‘enigma,’ but 
also, a meaning that is 
lost from the word in 
English, as a ‘plot.’
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this logical formula in the following way: Was it possible that he was not a 
believer?
Thus formulated, the question calls for an almost automatic response. 
Rabelais could not have been a non-believer. And why not? Not because 
we know that he was not one. We know nothing of what he thought deep 
down. He could not have been a non-believer because, to be one, it would 
have been necessary that it was possible for him to be one. And for that, it 
would have been necessary that the possibility of this possibility existed. The 
question, Lucien Febvre tells us, is not to know whether or not it was easy to 
be a non-believer in the sixteenth century. At all times, there are “hot heads” 
(cerveaux brûlés) who allow themselves to affirm or to deny whatsoever 
they choose, which is why they also end up as burnt bodies (corps brûlés). 
Hot heads who do not know what is possible and what is impossible prove 
nothing. One must, therefore, keep to the strict form of the question: “Let us 
not inquire whether a break was easy, but whether or not conditions were 
met that could have made a break possible.”11 To this question, the response 
is negative: the conditions of possibility for this possibility were not in place 
during Rabelais’ time. Why not? Quite simply, because he did not have 
time for it. The reality of empirical time confirms the impossibility which is 
registered in time as a transcendental condition. The “epoch” of Rabelais did 
not allow him non-belief, because the empirical time, of which the “epoch” 
itself is the transcendental principle, was a time completely determined in 
its “uses” by the Christian religion. This is what Lucien Febvre shows us 
when he sets out the conditions of individualisation and socialisation of 
some ordinary individual: 
A child is born. He lives. Without delay, they take him to the church 
and baptise him whilst the bells ring, which are themselves baptised 
by the bishop [...] A man dies. Whether or not his funeral services 
are arranged in his will (and those who shirk this obligation are rare), 
he is buried “as he must be,” in the Christian manner, in his family 
tomb [or] more often in some monastic church of the Dominicans, 
the Franciscans, or the Carmelites; and without social distinction, 
whether [he is] a baron or simple artisan. Could one refuse oneself 
a Christian burial? This was impossible, and unthinkable [...] Man 
comes about due to an apparently quite short term circumstance, namely 
Abel Lefranc’s preface to his own edition of Pantagruel. According to this 
latter, the forms of Rabelaisian parody hide a demolition of Christian 
religion. Lucien Febvre seeks to refute this thesis, which makes of Rabelais a 
non-believer obliged, quite simply, by the constraints of his time to mask his 
non-belief in the ambivalences of parody. But Febvre’s problem is, of course, 
not to clear Rabelais of the charge of atheism. It is to refute the conception 
of history that supports Abel Lefranc’s claims, a conception according to 
which, in a given epoch, there are people who are in advance of their time. 
It is to combat anachronism. Only, let us take note, anachronism is not a 
question of facts. It is a question of thought.
Lucien Febvre’s thesis is, therefore, the following: it is wrong to make 
of Rabelais a non-believer in disguise because that would be anachronistic. 
That would make contemporary to Rabelais’ time a thought that does not 
belong to it. What Abel Lefranc does, Febvre tells us, is to “commit the 
most serious and the most ridiculous of all anachronisms: in the realm of 
ideas it is like giving Diogenes an umbrella and Mars a machine gun.”10 
The comparison is striking, but obviously specious. We have enough 
information to assure us that in the time of Diogenes they did not use 
umbrellas and that in the time of the sculptures and figurines of Mars 
they did not use machine guns. Therefore we can say with confidence 
that Diogenes did not have an umbrella and Roman generals did not have 
machine guns available to them. To say, on the other hand, that Rabelais had 
not in mind the idea that the Christian religion was an immense joke poses 
completely different problems of verification. Yet it is precisely at this point, 
where the domain of the verifiable comes to an end, that the accusation 
of anachronism comes into play. The accusation of anachronism is not 
the claim that something did not exist at a given date. It is the claim that 
something could not have existed at this date.
This is indeed how Lucien Febvre proceeds. His initial question could 
be formulated as follows: is it true that Rabelais was a non-believer? But, 
he tells us, the formulation of this questions sounds like an examining 
magistrate. The scholar formulates the question differently: is it possible 
that he was a non-believer? And the historian shapes and temporalises 
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eats, and religion surrounds his diet of prescriptions, rites, and 
prohibitions [...] They are ill. They fear sickness. Certainly, the 
doctor is there to relieve patients. But the true recovery depends 
upon God, whether directly or by the mediation of the Saints of 
Paradise. And if it concerns an epidemic, especially the plague, what 
then? Quick, pilgrimages and vows to Saint Sebastian [...] The legacy 
is that there is nothing in all Christendom that does not begin with 
an invocation and a sign of the cross.12
In brief, private life, professional life, public life, all have their time 
completely determined and articulated by religion. That goes both for the 
ordinariness of days and for the extraordinariness of events. The conclusion 
is obvious: 
This religion, Christianity, is the coat of the Merciful Virgin Mary, so 
often represented in this way in our churches. All men, in all states, 
take shelter beneath this coat. It is impossible to want to escape from 
this coat. Huddled beneath these maternal folds, men do not feel 
that they are captive. To rebel, it would be necessary first of all to 
surprise oneself.13
Rabelais’ time does not allow him not to believe, because the form of 
this time is identical with the form of belief. Belonging to a time determines 
for mortals the very fact that they exist. Yet this belonging to a time is 
strictly identical to belonging to a belief. To not believe in the belief of his 
time would have meant for Rabelais to not exist. This presents itself in the 
form of a simple alternative: either Rabelais did not exist or he believed. Yet 
he existed, so he believed.
Of course, Lucien Febvre is not naive. He understands well that this 
shows a gap in his argument:
However, let us imagine an exceptional man. One of those few men 
that shows himself capable of being ahead of his contemporaries by 
a century, of formulating truths that will only be accepted as such 
fifty, sixty, or a hundred years later.14
But to unburden (soulever) oneself of the belief system of one’s time, one 
must have, he tells us, a lever (un levier). And where would Rabelais have 
found such a thing? Neither the philosophy nor the science of his time gave 
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(by the principle of co-presence) and not their parents (by the principle of 
succession), beings defined not by the vagaries [aléa] of successions, bodily 
and intellectual, but by contemporaneity with “their” time, beings that carry 
their time on their bodies, in all their ways of being and doing, and who 
carry it in their soul under the name of belief.
Earlier, I mentioned the formula on time taken from the Timaeus: “the 
mobile image of immobile eternity.” Yet, in the same text, this analogy finds 
itself completed by another, formulated thus: “What essence is to becoming, 
truth is to belief.”19 For Plato, of course, the analogy tends toward the 
opposition of two worlds of a radically unequal ontological content. For 
the historian, on the other hand, the eternity of simultaneity finds itself 
at home in the time of successions, as this latter’s principle of interiority. 
Which is to say that “belief ” will become the very mark of this truth lodged 
in time itself. Belief is nothing other than the subjective form of time. It is 
the resemblance of the historical agent to his time, and this resemblance is 
precisely the ersatz eternity that confirms for the historian’s discourse its 
position in truth. It is where time imposes its presence as belief that time 
resembles eternity. In an exemplary fashion, the everyday time of Rabelais 
does not allow time not to believe. It does not allow the time to not be of 
one’s time.
We now understand just what is at stake in the proscription of 
anachronism: this knotting of time and belief that assures the redemption 
of time and, therefore, the “truth” of the historian’s discourse. We also 
better understand the unpardonable character of the “sin of anachronism,” 
by comparing Febvre’s analysis to that of an historian whose declared 
Nietzscheanism should place him in complete opposition to the solid 
radical-socialist rationalism of Febvre. That historian is Paul Veyne. When, 
in his book Bread and Circuses, Veyne analyses the institution of charitable 
practices in antique Rome, he raises in passing the question of Christian 
charity as it is expressed not in the speculations of theology but in the 
original freshness of the Sermon on the Mount. Looking at it with the eyes 
of a historian, Veyne tells us that there is nothing original to the evangelical 
ideal expressed by these texts. This ideal was already the common 
good—the belief—of the Jews at the time of Jesus. Consequently, nascent 
him the supports necessary for that. As a consequence, it was impossible for 
him to put together a system of reasons sufficiently solid and well-supported 
to insist upon an effective negation of this Christianity that was the form for 
the organisation of the life of each and every one. In brief, so that Rabelais 
could be a precursor [of free thinking], he already would have needed his 
own precursors. It would have been necessary that the conditions of free 
thought—a free thought worthy of the name—existed for Rabelais to be 
able to be a free thinker. Yet they did not exist. And the alternative is posed 
anew: either Rabelais was not a non-believer, or he was a non-believer but 
without sufficient reason for being so. Consequently, his non-belief was only 
the individual fantasy of a hot-head. This fantasy was not non-belief of his 
time, in his time. It had no historical consistency. 
It hardly deserves to be discussed, any more than the sneers of the 
drunkard in the tavern who guffaws when he is told that the earth is moving, 
under him and with him, at such a speed that it cannot even be felt.15
If there existed at the beginning of the sixteenth century someone called 
Rabelais who did not believe in Christianity, his non-belief was not an 
object of history. “And from that point on, nothing remains for the historian 
but to forget all about it, and to leave Rabelais there.”16
To be an object of history is, therefore, to believe in the belief “of one’s 
time,” to belong to one’s time by the mode of belief, by the mode of unfailing 
adherence. This is what we are told by Febvre’s alter ego, Marc Bloch, in a 
formula that appears anodyne, but is nothing of the sort: “History is the 
science of men in time.”17 Marc Bloch liked to illustrate this with an Arab 
proverb: “Men resemble their time more than they resemble their parents.”18 
One must give these formulae a strongly theoretical meaning. They tell us 
this: For history to be a science, which is to say, so that it gains something 
of eternity, its time must as far as possible resemble eternity. How does a 
time resemble eternity? In being a pure present. For time to be redeemed 
there must be a pure present, a principle of the co-presence of historical 
subjects. Historical subjects must “resemble” their time, which is to say, they 
must resemble the principle of their co-presence. Two conditions therefore 
go together. Firstly, a time that is the principle not of succession but of 
simultaneity, of co-presence, and secondly, beings who resemble their time 
15. Ibid. 324.
16. Ibid. 
17. Trans. Marc Bloch, 
Apologie pour l’histoire, 
ou métier d’historien, 
(Paris: Armand Colin, 
1949), 18. Translated as 
The Historian’s Craft, 
(New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1953).
18. Ibid. 22.
19. Trans. Timaeus 
29c: Zeyl’s translation 
gives the following: 
“What being is to 
becoming, truth is to 
convincingness.”
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Christianity could not fail to endorse it, for two reasons. The first is that, 
taking into account the state of the general mood, “no popular preacher 
would have been listened to if he had not done the same.” The second, and 
most fundamental, is that no preacher could even have the idea to stray 
from this mood: 
And why should [Jesus] not have adopted it? He himself was only 
a man of the people, a member of the crowd that from below looks 
in awe at those who, in their palaces, live in honour and luxury [...] 
As for evangelical morality so for universalism: one should not ask 
questions that a man of the people, as brilliant as he might be, could 
not ask himself.20
In brief, in all epochs, one could only be a believer, which is to say, 
contemporary to one’s time. Jesus could only be a Jew of his time, Rabelais 
a Christian of his. In other words, Christianity has no more reason to be 
born at the time of the first than to die at the time of the second. To me, this 
text [Bread and Circuses] seems to summarise in an exemplary fashion the 
displacement of the status of truth that defines modern historical science. 
At the time of the Enlightenment and of critique, the question was asked: 
Is there a verifiable historical reality to what the Evangelists told us, or is 
it only a matter of fables? What testimonies do we have that an individual 
named Jesus had at that time spoken those words and accomplished those 
miraculous acts that the Evangelists attribute to him? In no time at all, the 
modern historian upsets the game and imposes another idea of truth: not 
“Is it true that...?” but “Was it possible not to...?” The word of the Evangelists 
is true because it was impossible for any contemporary of Jesus to say 
something other than what is said by the Evangelists. Belief is to truth what 
becoming is to essence. It is the necessity of belief that confirms the truth 
of science, which is to say, in Platonic terms, the presence of essence in 
becoming.
Of course, this confirmation has a very specific form. Belief is the object 
of science. The mark of analogical relation is also the mark of knowledge. 
For the historical agent, to resemble one’s time is to resemble it in the mode 
of belief, which means to not know one’s time. To be made of one’s time 
is to be made in ignorance. It is on the other side, the side of the scholar, 
20. Paul Veyne, Le pain 
et le cirque, (Paris: 
Seuil, 1976), 46–7. 
Translated by B. Pearce 
as Bread and Circuses: 
historical sociology 
and political pluralism, 
(London: Penguin, 
1990), 21–22.
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that the “resemblance” of belief is known for what it is. The time of the 
historical agent, as Febvre tells it, is a pure present. But the time of the 
scholar who alone knows this present for what it is, he is above this present 
(un surprésent), a more-than-present (un plus-que-présent) who retains 
resemblance [to his time] but eliminates its identity with ignorance.
The resemblance of man to his time, the impossibility of him to think 
otherwise to what his time makes thinkable, then becomes the allegory for 
the relation of science to its object. One who believes is, in Platonic terms, 
one who does not know. It makes an allegory of the difference between the 
science of the scholar and the ignorance of the one who does not know 
(l’ignorance de l’ignorant), the ignorance of the object of science. The theory 
of time implied by the denunciation of anachronism therefore has a double 
power. On the one hand, it redeems time. As far as possible, it makes time 
similar to eternity. Those who are conditioned by time, it fixes with the 
identity of belief/resemblance. In this sense, it guarantees for the first time 
the truth of history. But it does this a second time by giving to science, as a 
specific object, its other, which is to say, the being made of time, therefore of 
belief, and therefore of ignorance. Temporal “resemblance” normalises both 
the science of the scholar and the ignorance of the one who does not know. 
It therefore knots together the constraint of truth with a social constraint. I 
made reference above to the formulae in the Timaeus about the mobile time 
image of eternity. But, in the fictional construction of the Platonic dialogues, 
the Timaeus follows on from another dialogue, the Republic. In the Republic, 
time plays a particular role of division. There are those who have time 
and those who do not have time. In Book II, it is time, or more precisely, 
the absence of time, the absence of another time, that fixes the artisans in 
their place. They do not have the time, Socrates says, to occupy themselves 
with anything but their “own affairs,” the tasks that correspond to their 
nature and their function. Time thus assures the equivalence of a social 
distribution and an epistemic distribution. It separates the different ways 
in which to take part in the task of the city, thereby imitating the eternity of 
justice in the time of human affairs. On the one hand, there are those who 
have time to concern themselves with contemplation of the divine model 
and the forms of its temporal realisation. On the other hand, there are those 
who have not the time for this, and who, as a consequence, only imitate 
eternity passively, by the fact of not having the time to do anything but the 
work to which their nature predestines them.
In the time of historical science, of course, there is no longer a Platonic 
tripartite division of classes. But there remains the divisional function 
assigned to time. There remains this remarkable relation of truth to time, in 
a double sense: the order of the imitation of truth in time and the division 
between those who know and those who do not know. In the order of 
historical knowledge, this “belief,” which cannot be other than what it 
is, is the strict equivalent of that sophrosyne (‘self-control’) that was, for 
Plato, the unique virtue of the third class, a virtue without any content 
other than the simple subordination of those who cannot be anywhere 
else but in their place. The scientific city of the modern human and social 
sciences is modelled on the Platonic philosophical city. In this city, the 
relation of the temporal order to the order of eternity must be assured by 
specialists according to a strict distribution. What threatens the Platonic 
philosophical city are the artisans who escape their condition, who want to 
occupy themselves with more than their “own affairs,” and engage with the 
affairs of the city, even the affairs of philosophy. Likewise, what threatens 
the scientific city of history are words and thoughts that leave behind the 
strict obedience to belief similar to time. What threatens is the fact that the 
ordinariness of productive and reproductive life is seized and divided by 
the power of words that separate bodies from their destiny. What threatens 
is heresy, in the original meaning of the word, namely separation, life 
separated from itself by the power of words that short-circuit the strong 
relation of time to eternity as the exact distribution both of bodies in the 
city and of objects for science. What assures and reassures this threatened 
order is belief, in the strong sense of the term: the state of one who cannot 
not think what his or her time alone presents as thinkable. Consider these 
ritual phrases that scatter works on the history of mentalities, dealing 
with the belief of men of the medieval or classical epochs: “How would 
they have?” “How would they have not?” These are phrases that make up 
a regime of evidence incapable of stating itself theoretically as such. The 
regulation of time that history needs to assure its regime of scientificity is a 
38  In/Print June 2015
40  In/Print June 2015 41  Jacques Rancière The Concept of Anachronism and the Historian’s Truth
philosophical problem that is regulated, not philosophically, but poetically. 
Febvre’s book effectively gives a demonstration of this. Here, the doubling of 
time that gives truth to the knowledge of belief is never theorised as such. It 
is carried out, without being thematised, in the order of narration itself. The 
description of this sixteenth-century universe that does not allow non-belief 
thus uses a double poetic procedure concerning, in classical terms, dispositio 
and elocutio.
From dispositio comes a manner of composing a picture in such a way 
that the “anachronic” element—non-belief—appears there as an element 
visually incompatible with others, such as with a colour that clashes or a 
piece that is not cut from the same material. The “anachronic,” remember, 
is that which does not belong to or does not suit the time in which it is 
found. Where non-belonging cannot be demonstrated, which is to say when 
it is a matter of knowing what is and what is not in someone’s head, one 
appeals to what is unsuitable (la non-convenance). The demonstration of 
the “anachronic” happens, then, according to a well-established poetic logic 
of verisimilitude and its absence. But verisimilitude, like truth, has changed 
regime since the Romantic age. In the time of Voltaire and La Harpe, the 
rules of verisimilitude to which the representation of some historical 
character or the painting of some era had to submit were clearly explained. 
In the time of Lucien Febvre, the demonstration [of the “anachronic”] 
no longer has to be argued according to rules. It is carried out directly. 
Description requires the sensible evidence of what is in place in the picture 
and what is not. In the description of the everyday life of a man of the 
sixteenth century, non-belief has the status of a detail that does not fit. It 
would be like portraying a rude medieval lord in perfumed fineries.
The second procedure [elocutio] has a syntactical order. It consists of 
the creation of a more-than-present. “A child is born. He lives. Without 
delay, they take him to the church.” One must understand, of course, if he 
lives—which means, if he does not die at birth as did so many children—
then they take him to the church. But clearly this if would be unwelcome. 
It would slow down the story and introduce an element of chance into 
its purely assertory structure. If one suppresses it [this if ], statistically 
uncertain survival becomes life. Not the life of this particular child, but 
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life in general; life, the power of self-confirmation that makes itself 
evident as the identity of what is actual and what is possible. “This” child 
is placed in a present where the general rule and its particular illustration 
are indiscernible. The same goes for “a dead man,” where one must hear: 
“Let us take the case of a man who has just died,” or indeed “The plague 
strikes? Processions.” A modal and temporal system is deployed here, 
imperiously governed by a time—the present of the indicative—and even 
by a quasi-time, a detemporalised time, essentialised and made similar 
to the identity of eternity, similar to the absence of time. It is the time of 
the nominal phrase. “To refuse oneself a Christian burial? Impossible and 
unthinkable.” The phrase “normal” would say more or less the same thing: 
he could not imagine refusing a Christian burial, for him that would have 
been unthinkable. But to place this impossibility in the past is already to 
reduce it, to assign to it only the slightest existence. It would be better to 
write, in the spoken present of narration, “He cannot refuse...” Better again 
is simply to write “Impossible,” which is to suppress every temporal mark, 
every verbal mark, to make better felt how the time of Rabelais defined 
immediately the being of those who inhabited it, or who are inhabited by 
it. By this technique of the more-than-present that culminates in non-time, 
the existence of each and every one finds itself established as immediately 
identical to its essence. In other words, the description of the empirical case 
is established to be similar to the statement of the general rule. 
This temporal system noticeably clouds the opposition, made by 
Benveniste, between the system of discourse dominated by the present and 
the system of the story dominated by the past. According to this opposition, 
it is admissible to set down history as a mixture that narrates in the system 
of the past and explains in the system of the present.21 Yet Lucien Febvre 
presents us with a completely different articulation of the relation between 
the syntax of history and its semantics. He gives us a story that by the fact 
of being in the present—even the more-than-present—is already by itself 
the presentation of its own meaning. We know that he borrows this mode 
of account from [Jules] Michelet, the one who formulated the redemptionist 
programme of history. The historian is the character who crosses the river 
of the dead in order to redeem (racheter) at the same time the past, the 
21. See Emile 
Benveniste, Problèmes 
de linguistique 
générale, 2, (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1974), 83.
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unknown, and death. Febvre himself no longer needs this programme, no 
longer needs to dramatise the relation of the truth of history to the non-
truth of time. It is rather that he has at hand the product of Michelet’s 
operation, a product from which the process has disappeared, namely, the 
story in the present, which abolishes at the same time the non-truth of 
words and of time. This shows the triumph of the present or of presence 
and the immanence of meaning in the body of what is presented. Such is the 
story of the Fête de la Fédération of the 14th of July 1790, when the talkative 
but mute stories (les récits muets-bavards) of the village writers vanish 
in favour of the picture that, in their place, gives voice to the immanent 
meaning of life, a picture of the forces of nature at the time of harvests 
and flowers.22 It is this mode of story/discourse that imposes itself anew in 
the short phrases that make us see, in the everyday life of the man of the 
Renaissance, the absence of what it excludes: namely, the possibility that 
Rabelais could have been a non-believer.
Anachronism therefore concerns something quite other than a matter 
of defective chronology. It is the symbol-concept (le concept-emblème) by 
which history affirms its specificity and its scientificity. Anachronism is 
the symbol of a concept and a usage of time where this latter has absorbed, 
without trace, the properties of its contrary, eternity. The first paradox 
is that this mark of scientific difference is borrowed from the arsenal of 
poetics and rhetoric. A poetics of verisimilitude operating in these tableaux 
vivants shows us the impossibility that a thought make its home in a scene 
to which it does not belong. This poetics, we have said, regulates [thought] 
without posing the question of the relation of truth to speech and to time. 
But it regulates [thought] also by making itself invisible, by disappearing 
in the production of an immediate presence of concept in existence. The 
philosophical question [of whether or not thought fully belongs to its 
time] is hidden in the poetic resolution. But this poetic resolution is 
hidden in turn to make of the evidence of anachronism a clandestine 
ontological argument. Time, the principle of the co-presence of the 
phenomena to which it is present, becomes the very form of possibility of 
these phenomena. To exist is to belong to or to “suit” a time. It is to “suit” a 
concept of time identified with the principle of sufficient reason. It is to suit 
a philosophical principle of sufficient reason identified, in the last instance, 
with the old argument of the possible and the impossible around which the 
birth of rhetoric was carried out and by which it asserted its control. “How 
could it have been?” The elaboration of this question to make up for an 
unattributable truth establishes the legal power of rhetoric. “How could it 
not have been?” This is the philosophised form of the rhetorical argument, 
which now becomes an ontological argument, in which historical science, 
under the guise of good method, finally encloses truth and submits it to a 
time identified with the possible. Poetic procedures have enclosed eternity 
in time. In turn, time is made the condition of belonging to or suiting this 
eternity. At the end of the process, the eternity of the true is led back into 
the service of rhetorical argument, which in order to declare that something 
does not exist only needs to argue the impossibility of this existence. Under 
the guise of freeing science from the “truth” of judges, it is, in the final 
instance, to the verisimilitude of lawyers that science is now delivered.
We know the drift of this argument. Negationism is only the provocative 
form of this shameful ontological argument that submits historical existence 
to this “possibility according to the time,” which itself submits the principle 
of sufficient reason to the comforts of rhetoric.23 But one must draw out 
the consequences. Negationism is not simply a perverse effect, due to 
a vicious diversion of anti-anachronic precaution. It is the concept of 
anachronism that is, in itself, perverse. It is the submission of existence to 
the possible that is, at its core, anti-historical. The historian does not have to 
pronounce verdicts of inexistence in accordance with impossibilities whose 
status is indefinite. Above all, he does not have to identify the conditions 
of possibility and impossibility for the form of time. It is the very idea of 
anachronism as error about time that must be deconstructed. To say that 
Diogenes had an umbrella is simply, in so far as we know, an error about 
the accessories available to Athenians in the fourth century BCE. There is 
no particular reason to put this in a specific class of errors that would be 
“errors against time.” To say that Rabelais was a non-believer is a hypothesis 
that our knowledge about the forms of belief of his time and about his own 
biography allows us to hold in great suspicion. To say, on the other hand, 
that he could not have being [a non-believer] because his time denied the 
23. Cf. J. Rancière, 
Disagreement: Politics 
and Philosophy, 
translated by J. 
Rose, (Minneapolis: 
University of 
Minnesota Press, 1999), 
and “Les enoncés 
de la fin et du rien,” 
in J-J Forté and G. 
Leyenberger eds. 
Traversée du nihilisme, 
(Paris: Editions Osiris, 
1994). 
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possibility of non-belief is to make an unwarranted use of the category of 
the possible and, likewise, the category of time.
To deconstruct the category of anachronism is to undo a double knot: 
the knot of time with the possible and its knot with the eternal. It is, first of 
all, to free historical rationality from the clandestine games of the possible. 
It is also to undo this time from the co-presence that, on the one hand, 
clandestinely places eternity in time and, on the other hand, makes of this 
eternalised time a principle of possibility and impossibility. The concept 
of “anachronism” is anti-historical because it obscures the very conditions 
of all historicity. There is history insofar as men do not “resemble” their 
time, insofar as they act in breach of “their” time, in breach of the line of 
temporality that puts them in their place by obliging them to “use” their 
time in some way or other. But this rupture is itself only possible because of 
the possibility to connect this line of temporality with others and because of 
the multiplicity of lines of temporality present in any “one” time.
It is this play of heterogeneous temporal series that, to refer here to my 
own experience, I have tried to highlight in La nuit des prolétaires.24 With 
this book, it was a matter of questioning the connection between time, 
the possible and truth which was affirmed by the traditional definition 
of proletarian as “worker in heavy industry.” According to this definition, 
“proletarian” was the concept for an existence that was only possible at a 
precise moment in the course of history. It was explained that until the 
Industrial Revolution had attained a certain point, there could have been no 
true proletarians. It was therefore necessary to await the time in question up 
to the point where it appeared that this time had passed.
My own hypothesis was that, for reasons strictly opposed to the above, 
“proletarian” was the name of a historical agent and a historical mode of 
“making history.” It was the name for a rupture of the resemblance between 
workers and “their” time, the time of the ordinary cycle of time, the cycle 
of the day devoted to work and the night devoted to rest, which prevented 
workers from doing, in Platonic terms, anything other than what they 
should. It was, strictly speaking, a reversal of “their” time, and it was the 
connection of this topsy-turvy time with other lines of temporality: the 
new line of history, linked to the idea of history as a process in the making 
(processus d’un faire), and born of the rupture with continuity already 
accomplished by the revolutions in England, America, and France; the 
progressive time of the new palingenetic religions; but also the broken time 
that characterises the life of words, sentences, and meaning. “Proletarian” 
is, in fact, a word with a curious history. In a text of the second century CE, 
the Attic Nights of Aulus Gellius, the modern reader is surprised to find a 
chapter entitled “Qui sit proletarius?” He is even more surprised to find 
this text devoted to a discussion among erudite Romans about the possible 
meaning of this word that, at their time, had gone completely out of use. By 
studying old texts, these scholars end up finding the meaning of this archaic 
term in the Law of the Twelve Tables, the founding text of ancient Roman 
legislation. Proletarius, they discover, comes from proles, which signifies 
race and descent. In the first Roman age, the term refers to those men who 
do nothing other than live and make children without giving them a name, 
an identity, or a symbolic status within the city.
This ancient discussion about an out of use word is apt to make us 
understand why, in the modern age, the name of proletarian has been 
suitable to refer specifically to the rupture with the temporal logic of 
production and reproduction. But the length of time that this word, which 
in the second century of our Christian era could scarcely be understood by 
scholars, has been forgotten, has given this word the power to name a new 
connection of times. It now links the time of rupture with the banality of 
works and days, with the future of new times, and with the broken time that 
characterises the life of words and meaning.
There is no anachronism. But there are modes of connection that in 
a positive sense we can call anachronies: events, ideas, significations that 
are contrary to time, that make meaning circulate in a way that escapes 
any contemporaneity, any identity of time with “itself.” An anachrony is a 
word, an event, or a signifying sequence that has left “its” time, and in this 
way is given the capacity to define completely original points of orientation 
(les aiguillages), to carry out leaps from one temporal line to another.25 
And it is because of these points of orientation, these jumps and these 
connections that there exists a power to “make” history. The multiplicity of 
temporal lines, even of senses of time, included in the “same” time is the 
25. Trans. The French 
word aiguillage 
refers specifically to 
the points used for 
changing from one 
railway track to another. 
Rancière here uses the 
24. J. Rancière, The 
nights of labour: the 
workers’ dream in 
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France, translated by 
J. Dury, (Philadelphia: 
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condition of historical activity. Effective consideration of this should be the 
departure point for a historical science, less concerned with its “scientific” 
respectability and more concerned with what “history” means.
In response 
Brian Fay To respond briefly to Rancière’s expansive text is a difficult task. 
An essay so broad in scope, one that literally moves from pre-chronology 
to eternity, offers many diverse avenues to pursue. What strikes me most 
forcibly is Rancière’s proposition that time can be considered in and through 
a vertical divisible framework. This leads me to speculate what this framing 
might hold for the artist, via its consequences for the historian. 
Rancière suggests that the prefix ana- offers us a vertical structuring 
of time, where time and the anachronic action can be understood as a 
move from below to above. This structuring is somewhat unusual. Our 
general understanding and indeed diagrammatic depictions of temporality 
usually configure time as a horizontally orientated schema, with the 
‘now’ moment frequently depicted as moving along a single horizontal 
axis.1 Rancière’s ascent of time has correlations with Rosalind Krauss’s 
temporal claims for the palimpsest, which as a structure can be seen also 
to vertically order time.2 For Krauss, the palimpsest is “the emblematic 
form of the temporal and as such it is the abstraction of narrative, [and] 
of history.” While a palimpsest suggests a visual ordering, one stratum 
accumulatively placed upon another, its cumulative conclusion can be 
less determined, even abstract. Each layer may not fully obscure all that is 
beneath. Its vertical structuring creates an ambiguity in understanding its 
succession, or understanding how it is that an abstracted outcome arose 
from its construction. It asks the question what belongs where? Each layer 
may not visually belong solely to its own position, but can be seen to operate 
in multiple roles. In temporal terms each layer can be present in more than 
one time. This resembles Rancière’s suggestion that anachronism obscures 
the conditions of historicity by acknowledging the “multiplicity of lines of 
temporality present in ‘one’ time.” The palimpsest can be read, therefore, 
as two temporal models discussed in Rancière’s essay, the first, the causal 
model of before and after, being the accumulative action of layering, and the 
word figuratively.
1. See Bergson, Husserl 
and even to some 
degree Minkowski. 
For examples of time 
graphs in Bergson 
and Husserl see 
Daniel Birnbaum, 
Chronology, (New York: 
Sternberg Press, 2005), 
98–103. James Arnold 
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in ‘An advancing time 
hypothesis,’ European 
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second, a containment of time framed (or coagulated) as an epoch, being 
when the palimpsest is viewed in its entirety. 
Rancière suggests the sole method of history does not exist within 
a scientific claim but one that needs to resolve “philosophical questions 
by means of literary procedures.” Therefore, affinities can be considered 
between the work of the historian and that of the artist. John Lewis Gaddis 
reiterates this view.
Historians are able to manipulate time and space... they can compress 
these dimensions, expand them, compare them, measure them, even 
transcend them... the literal representation of reality is not their task.3 
While the models of verification remain distinct in each activity—
“Artists don’t normally expect to have their sources checked. Historians do.”4 
—Rancière in this text reiterates the need for our understanding of time to 
be plural, perhaps even “palimpsestic.” 
Connell Vaughan Evental thinking is at the heart of Jacques Rancière’s 
philosophy. In a number of his works, Rancière offers us events in the 
shape of historical subjects: Gillard in The Nights of Labour, Jacotot in The 
Ignorant Schoolmaster, and Blanqui in Disagreement. From the historical 
activity of these subjects we learn that an event is something that claims a 
radical equality whereby those who normally are excluded by the political 
count, by its practices and systems of representation, are made to count. 
Such events are more than mere occurrences in the sequence of time 
(chronos). The event, for Rancière, is the revelation and assertion of this 
historical subject on the basis of equality. Aesthetics, philosophy, education, 
politics and, in ‘The Concept of Anachronism and the Historian’s Truth,’ 
history, are seen by Rancière to condition and reinforce inequality. He 
charges history with performing the same ordering of inequality endemic to 
these other disciplines. In particular, the historian’s task has been to give the 
“appropriate” orders to different epochs. As regimes of order, however, these 
epochs are also regimes of power. The historian is, therefore, like the curator, 
the editor, the interior decorator, and the philosopher (for the latter, see 
The Philosopher and His Poor). The literary techne of history is a procedure 
of evaluation and re-evaluation, creation and re-creation of epochs bound 
3. John Lewis Gaddis, 
The Landscape of 
History: How Historians 
Map the Past, (Oxford: 
Oxford University 
Press, 2002), 17. 
4. Ibid. 17–18.
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by the constraints of chronos. Any confusion, any misplacing of epochs 
commits the sin of anachronism. 
When bound by chronos, anachrony is illogical, indecent and fatal, be 
it a flashback (analepsis) or a flash-forward (prolepsis). One way to think 
of this is in terms of the status of time travel as a devalued currency, be it 
in cash or immunity. Whichever direction you go, your purchasing power, 
your level of immunity, is out of sync. 
In the historian’s pursuit of truth the prohibition of “anachronism” is 
that temporal procedure that simultaneously makes the practice cohere as 
history and, for Rancière, limits the possibility of a philosophy (episteme) 
or science of history. “It [anachronism] is the symbol-concept (le concept-
emblème) by which history affirms its specificity and its scientificity”. Yet, 
“The concept of ‘anachronism’ is anti-historical because it obscures the very 
conditions of all historicity”.
A key condition obscured by anachronism is the possibility of the 
subject “breaching” her time, the epoch to which history has assigned her. 
This is, precisely, the evental activity mentioned above and it operates in a 
time that is explicitly not chronological. Rancière does not name this time, 
but it requires a view of history that is anachronic.
How would history become a science (or more science-like) and not 
simply a literary pretence? Rancière, not bound by the proscription of 
anachronism, points toward events that are more than mere occurrences 
in the sequence of time (chronos). True history, for Rancière, requires the 
assertion of a place in the count of the regime of power by those that have 
been allocated no part. It is a history unbound by the restrictions of history’s 
sequence of epochs. The structure of reflection on history must, necessarily, 
attend to evental change. 
Rancière explains history as it is practiced by the likes of Febvre as 
a literary inquiry conducted through the appropriate rhetorical modes 
(invention, dispositio, and elecutio) of enunciation. The additional two 
canons of rhetoric (memoria and pronuntiatio), unmentioned by Rancière, 
reveal a key feature of his evental approach. Within the canon of delivery 
(pronuntiatio) there is “the crucial moment” (kiaros). Equally, this crucial 
moment draws upon the canon of memory (memoria). Kiaros, as opposed 
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to chronos, is visible in the evental declarations of Gillard, Jacotot and 
Blanqui, and, I believe, is a useful way to articulate this evental breaching of 
chronos by the subject. 
In summary, and despite the absence of an account of kiaros, evental 
thinking pushes Rancière from history to historicity. With respect to the 
latter, other accounts of historical time are available, such as the eternity 
of the Christian Æon. For Rancière, eternity is, however, a failed attempt 
to redeem time, because it maintains the prohibition on anachronism. 
To the Epochists, who would have all time ordered, Rancière proposes a 
historicity beyond the epoch. This would be a historicity filled with evental 
declarations. This historicity, Rancière seems not to recognise, need not 
only await us in the future. It is already ancient. Perhaps it is as old as 
historical inquiry itself. In the Muqaddimah, Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406) 
was explicitly concerned with this notion of historicity. Like Febvre, Ibn 
Khaldun warned against anachronism. Here, too, history is understood 
in terms of social organization. Ibn Khaldun’s theory of “group feeling” 
(asabiyyah or asabīya), whereby history is understood in terms of social 
cohesion is analogous to the historical epoch. Over chronological time this 
will be lost inevitably and, potentially, dialectically by royal authority (mulk). 
Nonetheless, for Ibn Khaldun, like Rancière, history is more than a series 
of events. Admittedly, like Christian thinkers such as Saint Augustine, Ibn 
Khaldun sees a divine purpose to history. Yet this eternity is not subject to 
an equalling act of redemption, as witnessed in the case of the Christian 
Æon. Instead “perception by the soul does not take place in time and 
requires no consecutive order, but takes place all at once and within a single 
time element” (Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah, p. 106). This time element is 
“atomic” (zaman fard). Without depending upon a notion of divine time, 
Ibn Khaldun’s insistence on the indivisible moments of atomic time can 
accommodate what Rancière describes as a “multiplicity of temporal lines”.
In conclusion, historiography may not be the dominant way of viewing 
the past but Geschichteswissenschaft, the historical science that Rancière 
seeks, is far from a novel pursuit in the tradition of philosophy. Rancière’s 
positive contribution to this episteme is undoubtedly his evental approach.
